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I. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
A foreign state is immune from suit, and its property immune from attachment and
execution, unless an exception enumerated in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA or the Act) applies.' In Doe v. Bin Laden, a lawsuit against Afghanistan for harms to
victims in the September 11 th attacks, the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion
to dismiss filed by Afghanistan, finding that the claims for assault and battery and wrong-
ful death fell within the scope of the Act's exception for noncommercial torts.2 The court
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1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2009).
2. Doe v. Bin Laden, 663 F.3d 64, 64-70 (2d Cit. 2011).
166 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
rejected the argument, supported by a prior Second Circuit decision, 3 that the exception
was not available because the claim did not also satisfy the Act's terrorist attack exception.
Rather the court noted that its prior ruling was in conflict with the plain language and
legislative history of the terrorism exception, including recent amendments to the Act
reflecting Congress's intent to expand the scope of jurisdiction over sovereigns, not to
narrow it.
4
Immunity under FSIA can still be successfully invoked in a myriad of circumstances. In
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Repziblica Argentina, the Second Circuit ruled that
funds held by the Republic of Argentina's central bank at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York were immune from restraint by Argentina's judgment creditors.5 The court
rejected the creditors' argument that immunity should depend on the degree of the central
bank's independence from its government, finding the argument unsupported by the text
and noting that at the time of the FSIA's enactment, Congress "had no reason to believe
that foreign central banks and monetary authorities would be independent of their parent
states because, at that time, most were not."6 The court concluded that the immunity of a
foreign central bank's property is governed solely by § 161 l(b)(1), which immunizes prop-
erty that is "held [by a central bank] for its own account." 7 The court set forth a test
under which property will be deemed held for its own account-i.e., if it is operating in
the name of the central bank and used for central banking functions, and the plaintiff
seeking to defeat immunity demonstrates with specificity that the property is "not being
used for central banking functions as such functions are normally understood, irrespective
of their commercial nature."8
In Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, the Seventh Circuit examined FSIA limitations
on post-judgment asset discovery in the sovereign context and agreed with the Second,
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits that such "discovery should be ordered circumspectly and only
to verify allegations of specific facts crucial to an immunity determination." 9 The court
held that to overcome the presumption that sovereign property is immune from attach-
ment, "[a] plaintiff must identify the particular foreign state property he seeks to attach
and then establish that it falls within a statutory exception."") The court, therefore, re-
jected a general-asset discovery order issued by the district court against Iran because it
"gave plaintiffs a 'blank check' entitlement to discovery."" The plaintiffs argued that Iran
could not challenge the discovery order because it had not appeared below, but the court
held that "a court may find an exception [to immunity]-with or without an appearance by
the foreign state." 12
3. In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 89 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that "to apply the
Torts Exception where the conduct alleged amounts to terrorism within the meaning of the Terrorism Excep-
tion would evade and frustrate that key limitation on the Terrorism Exception").
4. Bin Laden, 663 F.3d at 65-70.
5. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Repliblica Argentina, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011).
6. Id. at 190-91.
7. Id. at 190.
8. Id. at 191-94.
9. Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 796 (7th Cir. 2011).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 800; see also Walters v. Indus. & Com. Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 290 (2d Cir. 2011)
(following Rubin, 637 F.3d at 796).
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In FG Hemisphere Assocs, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the D.C. Circuit
held that "the FSIA does not abrogate a court's inherent power to impose contempt sanc-
tions on foreign sovereigns." 13 The court rejected the DRC's reliance on a Fifth Circuit
ruling prohibiting monetary sanctions against sovereigns as conflating the distinction be-
tween the power to order sanctions and the ability to enforce them.' 4 Although the latter
"could prove problematic," nothing in the text or legislative history of the FSIA suggests
that a court lacks the authority to grant such orders in the first instance.
15
II. International Service of Process
International service of process is governed by Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 4(f) states that an individual may be served outside of the United States
"by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice,
such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents." 16 The Rule goes on to describe methods other than the Hague
Convention, providing in Rule 4(f)(2) that, if there is no internationally agreed upon
means, service may be made "by a method that is calculated to give notice," such as "deliv-
ering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally," 17 and
providing in Rule 4(0(3) that service may be made "by other means not prohibited by
international agreement, us the court orders."1s
In Cascade Yarns, Inc. v. Knitting Fever, Inc., the court explained that Rule 4(0(3) is
"neither a last resort nor extraordinary relief... [but] merely one means among several
which enable service of process on an international defendant." 19 Alternative service
methods approved by the courts include publication, ordinary mail, email, and delivery to
a defendant's attomey.20 But the court in CGC Holding Co. v. Hutcbens21 clarified that
"[pirior to granting a motion to allow alternate service under Rule 4(f)(3), the court may
require that [the] plaintiff show that he made reasonable efforts to serve the defendant and
that the court's intervention will avoid further unduly burdensome or futile efforts as ser-
vice." 22 In In re China Educ. Alliance Sec. Litig.,23 plaintiffs served the defendants' Califor-
nia office, but the court found that the service was not "reasonably calculated" to apprise
each individual of the pending litigation because some defendants no longer worked for
the company and plaintiffs "cannot simply rely on the agent to deliver the summons and
complaint."2 4 In In re Heckman Corp. Sec. Litig., the court held that Rule 4(f)(3) does not
13. FG Hemis. Assoc., LLC v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 637 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
14. Id. at 376-79 (discussing Af-Cap Inc. v. Congo, 462 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2006)).
15. Id. at 375, 378.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(0(1).
17. Id. 4(0(2).
18. Id. 4(0(3).
19. Cascade Yams, Inc. v. Knitting Fever, Inc., No. CIO-86IRSM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35761, at **4-5
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 18, 2011).
20. ld. at *5.
21. CGC Holding Co., LLC v. Hutchens, No. 11-cv-01012-WYD-KLM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69422
(D. Col. June 28, 2011).
22. Id. at **3-4.
23. In re China Educ. Alliance Secs. Liug., No. CV 10-9239 CAS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94494, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011).
24. Id. at *9.
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permit service upon a party's counsel if there is not regular contact between the attorney
and the party.25
In Intercont'l Indus. Corp. v. Qingquan, the court found that, although China had ex-
pressly rejected service of process by "postal service" in its ratification of the Hague Con-
vention, it had not expressly rejected service of process by publication, and thus could be
considered sufficient so long as it was "reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to
apprise [the party] of the pendency of the action and afford [it] an opportunity to present
objections." 26
In Kexuan Yao v. Crinic Fund, S.A., the court found that emailing a link to copies of a
summons and complaint was insufficient service of process in Costa Rica, stating that it
was unaware of any authority approving the use of email for serving process and that for
service by mail to be effective under Rule 4(0(2) or (0(3).27 The court held that the plain-
tiff must submit proof of service such as a "receipt signed by the addressee, or by other
evidence satisfying the court that the summons and complaint were delivered to the ad-
dressee" and that a receipt signed by a third party was insufficient. 28 The court noted that
it would only dismiss the complaint for failure of service "when there is no reasonable
prospect that service may be completed." 29
I. Personal Jurisdiction
In J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,30 the Supreme Court revisited personal jurisdic-
tion for the first time in decades and significantly limited the "stream of commerce" doc-
trine under which a plaintiff may hail a foreign manufacturer into a U.S. court so long as
the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known that its products would be dis-
tributed to the United States. 31 In a four-Justice plurality opinion by Justice Kennedy
(joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas; concurrences by jus-
tices Breyer and Alito; 32 and dissents from by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan),
the Court held that the due process analysis should focus on the defendant's purposeful
availment of U.S. laws rather than on fairness and the foreseeability of being hailed into a
specific court.33 The Court emphasized that "[t]he principal inquiry in cases of this sort is
whether the defendant's activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sover-
25. In re Heckman Corp. Secs. Litig., No. 10-378-LPS-MPT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134402, at **12-14
(D. Del. Nov. 22, 2011) (distinguishing Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Inc., No. 08-4775, U.S. Dist. LEXIS
129870 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2010), where service was sufficient because the party had regular contact with
counsel).
26. Intercon. Indus. Corp. v. Qingquan, No. CV 10-4174-JST (Ex.), 2011 WL 221880, at *8 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 20, 2011).
27. Kexuan Yao v. Crisnic Fund, S.A., No. SACV 10-1299 AG (JCGx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97358, at
**12-13 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011).
28. Id. at *16.
29. 1d. at "22.
30. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011).
31. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
32. J. McIntyre Macb., 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Justices Breyer and Alito were reluctant to announce a new "rule
of broad applicability without full consideration of the modem-day consequences" and would have reached
the same conclusion, relying narrowly on existing Court precedent.).
33. Id. at 2788.
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eign."34 On the facts, Justice Kennedy held that due process prevented a New Jersey
court from hearing a products liability lawsuit against a U.K. manufacturer where only
four of the manufacturer's products reached New Jersey and where the manufacturer did
not have offices, pay taxes, or advertise in New Jersey.35 The Court insisted it was not
ending the stream of commerce doctrine, noting that when a defendant places a product
in the stream of commerce "with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers
within the forum State," it may, but does not necessarily, indicate the level of purposeful
availment necessary for due process.3 6 In the simultaneously issued opinion Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Supreme Court further limited the stream of
commerce doctrine by clarifying that it does not apply to products causing injuries abroad,
even if those injuries were inflicted on Americans by products that were also distributed in
the forum state.37
IV. The Act of State Doctrine
The "act of state" doctrine is a prudential limitation on the exercise of judicial review in
matters of foreign relations more appropriately left to other branches of government,
whereby U.S. courts will avoid reviewing cases that require passing judgment on the valid-
ity of the official acts of a foreign state performed in its own territory.38
A. EXPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
In De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, the district court declined to apply the act of state
doctrine in a case brought by heirs to an art collection that Hungary confiscated when it
was allied with Nazi Germany during World War II.39 The court found that the acts at
issue-post-war bailment agreements-were not sovereign, but rather "purely commer-
cial acts" that "do not require deference under the act of state doctrine." 4° The court
declined to apply the doctrine for two additional reasons: (1) the "courts have consistently
held that the act of state doctrine does not apply to the Nazi taking of Jewish property
during the Holocaust,"41 and (2) the doctrine is disfavored where, as was the case with the
Nazi-era Hungarian government "the government which perpetuated the challenged act
of state is no longer in existence." 42
In contrast, the district court in Konowaloff v. Metro. Museum of Art applied the act of
state doctrine to a case involving an heir's claim to a painting that the Russian Bolshevik
government allegedly expropriated under a 1918 nationalization decree. 43 The court rec-
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2790.
36. Id. at 2788.
37. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854-55 (2011).
38. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964); Siderman de Blake v. Repub-
lic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 707 (9th Cir. 1992).
39. De Csepel v. Republic of Hung., No. 10-1261, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98573, at **66-70 (D.D.C. Sept.
1,2011).
40. Id. at **68-69.
41. Id. at **69-70.
42. Id. at *70 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428).
43. Konowaloffv. The Metro. Museum of Art, No. 10 Civ. 9126 (SAS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107262, at
"17-18 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011).
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ognized that "the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and this Court have consistently
held Bolshevik/Soviet nationalization decrees to be official acts accepted as valid for the
purposes of invoking the act of state doctrine." 44
B. ADJUDICATION OF Ius Cogens Norms
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, the Ninth Circuit held that the act of state doctrine did not
bar adjudication of claims by residents of Papua New Guinea for human rights violations
(deaths and injuries allegedly caused by a military crackdown following an uprising against
the defendant mining company) under the Alien Tort Statute because the claims alleged
violations of jus cogens norms "from which no derogation is permitted." 45
C. COMMERCIAL AcTIvrT EXCEPTION
In In re Transpac. Passenger Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., two state-owned airlines sought
to invoke the act of state doctrine to dismiss claims that they conspired to fix prices of air
passenger travel.46 The court rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to invoke the commercial
activity exception to the doctrine, holding that while the Supreme Court "has spoken of" a
commercial activity exception, "only a plurality of the Court has endorsed that princi-
ple." 47 Nonetheless, relying in part on a declaration from the State Department, the court
denied the motion to dismiss pending further factual development as to whether the
claims actually implicated sovereign acts and, if so, whether any exceptions applied.48
D. EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
In Spectrum Stores v. Saudi Arabian Oil Co., oil retailers brought suit against defendant
oil companies claiming violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act for defendants' alleged
conspiracy with Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Russia, and others to fix prices through limits on
their production of crude oil. 49 The Fifth Circuit held that the act of state doctrine ap-
plied because the claim was based on foreign sovereigns' acts to regulate the production
and sale of crude oil within their own territory, and that "exploitation of natural resources
is an inherently sovereign function."50
Adjudication of the claim, the court held, would necessarily impact the U.S. govern-
ment's important foreign relations with oil-producing states.5'
44. Id. at *17.
45. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, No. 02-56256, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21515, at **46-47 (9th Cir. Oct. 25,
2011) (en banc) (quoting Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 714).
46. In re Transpac. Passenger Air Transp. Air Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-05634 CRB, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49853, at *'62-63 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2011).
47. Id. at **64-65.
48. Id. at **65-68.
49. Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938, 942-43 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 366 (2011).
50. Id. at 954.
51. Id. at 95 5-56. The court also rejected plaintiffs' attempt to invoke a commercial activity exception. Id.
at 955, n.16.
VOL. 46, NO. 1
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 171
V. International Discovery
A. OBTAINING U.S. DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
In 2011, several federal appellate courts addressed questions regarding the requirements
for obtaining discovery in the United States for use in foreign proceedings pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1782(a)52 and the factors set out in one Supreme Court case addressing the pro-
vision, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.5 3 In Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc.,
the Seventh Circuit cautioned that "district courts must be alert for potential abuses" that
warrant denial of discovery requests under section 1782, and emphasized that "the ordi-
nary tools of discovery management, including Rule 26" should be used to govern the
scope of any discovery that is permitted. 54 Similarly, another court granted section 1782
discovery but recognized the "potentially substantial burdens" of the discovery requests
and ordered that the requesting party bear all of the responding parties' costs of
production. 55
The Ninth Circuit held the U.S.-Russia Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (Treaty) super-
sedes section 1782 and, accordingly, requests pursuant to that Treaty "utilize the procedu-
ral mechanisms" of section 1782, but are not restrained by its substantive limitations. 56
The court emphasized that almost all of the section 1782 discretionary factors were re-
solved in favor of granting the discovery when the United States signed and ratified the
Treaty and 'that such factors "would weigh automatically in favor of granting the
request."57
In one of many discovery disputes stemming from litigation by Ecuadorian plaintiffs in
Ecuadorian courts against Chevron Corp. (and a related arbitration by Chevron against
the Republic of Ecuador in The Hague), the Third Circuit rejected responding parties'
arguments that the evidence sought would not be "for a use in a proceeding" before an
international tribunal, agreeing with the applicant that the evidence could "be utilized to
cast doubts on the impartiality of the [Ecuadorian] court."58
Courts continue to grapple with whether private arbitral bodies fall within the scope of
foreign tribunals to which section 1782 applies. In In re Finserve Grp. Ltd., the Court
denied a discovery request for use in the London Court of International Arbitration
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1996) ("The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may
order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding
in a foreign or international tribunal . ... ").
53. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264-65 (2004) (articulating three statutory
requirements: (1) the discovery must be sought from a person residing in the district of the court to which
the application is made, (2) the discovery must be for use in a proceeding before a foreign tribunal, and (3) the
applicant must be a foreign or international tribunal or an interested person; and four discretionary factors:
(1) whether the person for whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding, (2) the nature
of the proceedings and the "receptivity" of the foreign court to U.S. federal court assistance, (3) whether the
application is an attempt to circumvent foreign proof gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign
country, and (4) whether the request is unduly burdensome or intrusive).
54. Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 594-97 (7th Cir. 2011).
55. Alunad Hamad Algosaibi & Bros. v. Standard Chartered Int'l (USA) Ltd., 785 F. Supp. 2d 434, 439
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
56. In re Premises Located at 840 140th Ave. NE, Bellevue, Wash., 634 F.3d 557, 571 (9th Cir. 2011).
57. Id.
58. In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 161 (3d Cir. 2011).
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(LCIA) arbitration after noting that the LCIA Arbitration Rules provide that decisions by
arbitrators are treated as administrative and lack judicial review.s9
B. OBTAINING DISCOVERY FROM ABROAD FOR USE IN U.S. PROCEEDINGS
In 2011, several U.S. courts applied the discretionary factors articulated by the Supreme
Court and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law for evaluating requests for
discovery of information located abroad for use in U.S. proceedings. 60 In Tiffany (N.J.)
LLC v. Qi Andrew, despite the fact that several factors of the comity analysis weighed in
favor of ordering discovery, the court refused to compel production of documents that
could lead to possible civil and criminal sanctions under Chinese law.61 Instead, the court
held that the parties should proceed under the Hague Evidence Convention to acquire
such evidence, noting that State Department materials had removed language critical of
China's compliance with the Hague Evidence Convention and that China's article 2 3 res-
ervation to the Convention would not necessarily preclude the discovery plaintiff
sought.62 Similarly, in S.E.C. v. Stanford Int'l Bank, Ltd., the Court found that the foreign
party might face substantial hardship under Swiss law privacy statutes if it complied with a
U.S. discovery request and directed the parties to the Convention, though it did not rule
out revisiting the balancing of factors if the requesting party could not obtain discovery
through the Convention as directed. 63
In In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., a court-appointed Special Master at-
tempted to weigh the discretionary factors for a discovery request in light of confidential-
ity objections submitted by the European Commission and the Japan Fair Trade
Commission.64 Finding that he lacked knowledge of critical facts, including which spe-
cific documents were at issue, the Special Master ordered the documents be produced for
in camera review and held that such review alone would not violate European or Japanese
laws.65 The district court upheld the order.
66
VI. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law
When determining whether to apply U.S. law extraterritorially, courts refer to the Re-
statement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which provides that
a State may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction where the conduct in question "has or is
intended to have a substantial effect within its territory."67
59. In re Finserve Grp. Ltd., No. 4:11-mc-2044-RBH, 2011 WL 5024264, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2011).
60. Socidt Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. S.D. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 539 (1987) (holding that the
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence
Convention) is not the exclusive means for obtaining evidence located abroad); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW § 442(1)(c) (1987).
61. Tiffany (NJ.) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
62. Id. at 161.
63. S.E.C. v. Stanford Int'l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
64. In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. M 07-1827 SI, 2011 WL 723571 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22,
2011).
65. Id. at *2-3.
66. Id. at *3-4.
67. REsrATFNT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELAInONS § 402 (1987). In making this determination, courts
consider a number of factors set out in the Restatement at §403(2).
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A. Cimn'AL STATUTES
In United States v. Hijazi, the defendants were charged with violations of the Major
Fraud Act and other statutes. 68 The district court held that the statutes under which
Hijazi was charged applied extraterritorially. In overcoming the presumption against ex-
traterritorial application of statutes as enumerated in Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank,69 the
court relied on United States v. Bowman for the principle that certain criminal statutes are
not dependent on their locality, 70 but are enacted "because of the right of the government
to defend itself against obstruction or fraud."7' The court held that the defendants' ac-
tions were intended to have a substantial effect within the United States because the
United States was the ultimate payer of the subcontract underlying the alleged fraud, and
therefore this amounted to the theft of millions of dollars from the U.S. treasury. 72 In
addition, the court held that jurisdiction was reasonable because the United States has a
right to protect itself from crimes against it, and that exercise of this right did not detract
from the sovereignty of the jurisdiction where the actions occurred; especially Kuwait
because it would not have had any jurisdiction over Hijazi's fraud against the United
States. 73
In United States v. Weingarten, the Second Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), which
prohibits transportation of a minor with intent to engage in a criminal sexual activity, and
18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), which prohibits travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct,
apply to activities occurring during travel to and from the United States, but not to travel
between foreign countries.74 The defendant, a U.S. citizen, was convicted of four counts
related to sexual abuse that occurred when he traveled with his daughter to and from the
United States and one count involving travel between foreign countries. He moved to
dismiss this count, arguing that his travel had no nexus to the United States, and that
therefore his activity was not within the ambit of congressional authority.75 The court
agreed that the text prohibiting travel "in foreign commerce" was ambiguous as to
whether it applies to travel with no nexus to the United States and reversed the conviction
on the one count of foreign-only travel. 76
In United States v. Campbell, the court determined that 18 U.S.C. § 666, which prohibits
solicitation of a bribe by an agent or organization receiving more than $10,000 in federal
funds, applies to criminal conduct occurring outside the United States.77 Campbell, an
Australian citizen and a construction manager for the International Organization for Mi-
gration in Afghanistan who worked on USAID-funded contracts, requested and accepted
(in Afghanistan) payments from an undercover investigator in return for an award of a
68. United States v. Hijazi, No. 05-40024-02, 2011 WL 2838172 (C.D. Ill. July 18, 2011).
69. Morrison v. Nat'l Aust. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 177 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2010).
70. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922); see also United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108 (9th Cir.
2011) (noting that the presumption that.acts of Congress do not apply extraterritorially does not apply to
criminal statutes, and extraterritoriality may be inferred by the nature of the offense).
71. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.
72. Hijazi, 2011 WL 2838172, at *8-9.
73. Id.
74. United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2011).
75. Id. at 68.
76. Id. at 69.
77. United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2011).
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subcontract. 78 Relying on Bowman, the court held that the exercise of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction for section 666 was appropriate even for non-U.S. citizen defendants. Campbell
argued that even if section 666 could be applied extraterritoially, there was an insufficient
nexus to the United States and therefore his prosecution would violate his rights to due
process, but the court found that Campbell's actions directly implicated U.S. interests in
preserving "the integrity of its vast sums of donated monies to be free from corruption,
bribery and fraud." 79 Finally, the court held that prosecution of Campbell did not violate
any customary international law because of the United States' protective interests at
stake.80
B. Rico
In In re Le-Nature's, Inc., the district court, relying on Morrison v. National Australia
Bank Ltd.81 and Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc.,8 2 affirmed that the RICO statute
does not apply extraterritorially, but rejected the defendants' argument that "RICO can-
not apply to foreign conduct merely because the enterprise is domestic." 8 3 Defendants in
Le-Nature's were German citizens, but engaged in a domestic scheme to overvalue indus-
trial equipment leases. The court held that RICO focuses on domestic rather than foreign
enterprises, meaning that a domestic enterprise, even if undertaken by foreign citizens,
falls within the ambit of RICO.s4
C. SECURrrIEs LAW
In the wake of the Supreme Court's 2010 ruling in Morrison, several defendants moved
unsuccessfully to dismiss securities fraud charges by arguing that their extraterritorial con-
duct does not fall within the ambit of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.85 In United States v. Mandell, Defendants sought dismissal because the charges
against them were based on the sale or purchase of shares on the Alternative Investment
Market of the London Stock Exchange.8 6 However, the court declined to dismiss under
Morrison, noting that the defendants were U.S. citizens doing business in New York and
selling shares in U.S. companies to U.S. citizens, even if the transactions and investors are
foreign.8 7 Similarly, in S.E.C. v. Compania Internacional Financiera S.A., a defendant ar-
gued that § 10(b) did not apply to his conduct because it involved contracts traded in
London, but the court focused on the fact that the alleged deceptive conduct still involved
78. Id. at *2.
79. Id. at *11.
80. Id. at *11-12.
81. Morrison v. Nat'l Ausd. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 177 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2010).
82. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. dismissed, 180 L. Ed. 2d
913 (2011).
83. In re Le-Nature's, Inc., No. 9-MC-162, 2011 WL 2112533 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011).
84. Id. at *3.
85. Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1934).
86. United States v. Mandell, No. S1 09 CR. 0662 PAC, 2011 WL 924891 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011).
87. Id. at *5.
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securities listed on a domestic exchange, and, therefore, could be prosecuted under
§ 10(b).88
VII. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Judgments
In U.S. courts, the "New York Convention"89 governs the recognition and enforcement
of most foreign arbitral awards and is implemented in U.S. law through Chapter Two of
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).90 State law governs the recognition and enforcement
of foreign court judgments. Many states have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judg-
ments Recognition Act, which is based upon the comity principles expressed in Hilton v.
Guyot.9'
A. FoREIGN ARBrni.AL AwARDs
In Argentine Republic v. National Grid PLC, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision confirming an arbitral award, which found Argentina liable to National Grid
PLC, a U.K. company.92 Days before the expiration of the FAA's three-month time pe-
riod for serving notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award, Argentina filed
a motion to vacate and a Rule 6(b)(1) motion for an extension of time to accomplish
service.93 The district court denied Argentina's motion, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed de
novo, stating that the FAA's three-month notice period "create[d] a strict deadline," and
that Rule 6(b) may be used "only to extend time limits imposed by the court itself or by
other Federal Rules" and "may not be used to extend statutory time limits." 94
In Int'l Trading and Indus. Inv. Co. v. DynCorp Aero. Tecb., the District Court for the
District of Columbia confirmed an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitral
award, which found a breach of contract by DynCorp.95 The seat of the arbitration was
Paris, France, procedure was governed by the ICC Rules, and Qatari law governed mat-
ters of substance. 96 After issuance of the award, DynCorp obtained a set-aside from the
Qatari Court of Cassation (a proceeding in which International Trading "voluntarily par-
ticipated") and sought, but was refused, vacatur from the Paris Court of Appeal. 97 Mean-
while, International Trading sought recognition and enforcement of the award in the
88. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Compania Internacional Financiera S.A., No. 11 Civ. 4904(DLC), 2011 WL
3251813, at "6 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011).
89. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
90. 9 U.S.CA §§ 201-08 (West 2011). The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, known as the "Panama Convention," governs the recognition and enforcement of awards among
member States of the Organization of American States who are party and is implemented in U.S. law through
Chapter 3 of the FAA. 9 U.S.CA. §§ 301-07 (West 2011).
91. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). In 2005, the Uniform Law Commission promulgated a revised
act, the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, which has since been enacted by a
number of states.
92. Argentine Republic v. Nat'l Grid PLC, 637 F.3d 365, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
93. Id. at 366-67 (citing 9 U.S.C.A. § 12 (West 2011)).
94. Id. at 368.
95. Int'l Trading & Indus. Inv. Co. v. DynCorp Aero. Tech., 763 F. Supp. 2d 12,17-18, 31 (D.D.C. 2011).
96. Id. at 17.
97. Id. at 18-19.
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District of Columbia. 98 The D.C. District Court found that the Qatari court was not a
"court of competent jurisdiction" under the Convention and lacked authority to vacate the
award. 99 DynCorp argued that by participating, International Trading had "assented" to
the Qatari court's jurisdiction, but the D.C. District Court found that "consent has no
binding effect" in light of its own independent "duty to determine whether the Qatari
courts are 'competent authorities' within the meaning of Article V(1)(e)." 00 The D.C.
court also rejected DynCorp's argument that the award should not be confirmed because
the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law, finding "no support in either the text
of the New York Convention or case law... that an arbitrator's 'manifest disregard of the
law' is a valid basis upon which the Court can deny confirmation of an arbitral award."1 01
B. FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS
In Osorio v. Dow Cbemical Co., the Eleventh Circuit refused recognition and enforce-
ment of a $97 million judgment awarded by a Nicaraguan court to Nicaraguan agricul-
tural workers who were allegedly injured by exposure to a Dow Chemical pesticide used
by Dole Food on banana plantations in Nicaragua.1 02 The court found that Dow Chemi-
cal could satisfy three out of the four independent grounds for non-recognition articulated
in Florida's Out-of-Country Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act.10 3 The court
expressly "decline[d] to adopt the district court's holding" on the fourth ground, namely
"the broader issue of whether Nicaragua as a whole 'does not provide impartial
tribunals.' "104
In Sea Search Armada v. Republic of Colombia, the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia dismissed plaintiff Sea Search's request for recognition of a Supreme Court of
Colombia judgment granting it rights to an equal share of the treasure to be recovered
from an early eighteenth century shipwreck. 105 The court noted that the District of Co-
lumbia's Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition Act' 06 "indicates that it is re-
served exclusively for judgments awarding or declining to award a sum of money," and
that the sum must be "specific." 10 7 Because Sea Search's own characterization of the Co-
lombian judgment made clear that it "merely determined what percentage" of the recov-
ered shipwreck Sea Search owned and "did not order that [Sea Search] be paid a 'sum of
98. Id. at 18.
99. Id. at 21-24 (citing Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, supra note 89, art.
V(1)(e) and Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas, 364 F.3d 274, 289 (5th Cir.
2004)).
100. Id. at 23.
101. Id. at 30-3 1. The court noted that, even if that standard applied, there was no evidence in the record
that the arbitrator had acted in manifest disregard of the law. Id.
102. Osorio v. Dow Chemical Co., 635 F.3d 1277, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2011).
103. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 55.601-55.607 (West 2011); Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1278-79 (affirming non-recogni-
tion on the basis of (1) lack of "subject matter and/or personal jurisdiction over the defendants;" (2) that the
judgment "was rendered under a system which does not provide ... procedures compatible with the require-
ments of due process of law;" and (3) that recognition "would be repugnant to Florida public policy").
104. Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1279.
105. Sea Search Armada v. Republic of Columbia, No. 10-2083 JEB), 2011 WL 5027640, at *1 (D.D.C.
Oct. 24, 2011).
106. D.C. CODE §§ 15-381-15-388 (2011).
107. Sea Searcb Armada, 2011 WL 5027640, at *5-6.
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money,"' the court found that the judgment did not qualify as a money judgment under
the D.C. Recognition Act and granted Colombia's motion to dismiss. 1°8
VIII. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens "allows a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction
and dismiss a case where that case would be more appropriately brought in a foreign
jurisdiction."109 "A party moving to dismiss based on forum non conveniens bears the
burden of showing that (1) there is an adequate alternative forum, and (2) the balance of
private and public interest factors favors dismissal.""h 0
A. PosT-DisMissAL EvIDENCE OF UNAVAILABILITY OF AN ADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE
FORUM
Recent cases suggest that some parties may have a second chance to prove that an alter-
native forum is "unavailable." In Gutierrez v. Advanced Medical Optics (Gutierrez), the
Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to reconsider its forum non conveniens determi-
nation after new evidence surfaced during pendency of the appeal.II' The Gutierrez plain-
tiffs pursued remedies in Mexico simultaneous with their appeal of their FNC dismissal
and quickly obtained multiple ex parte orders from Mexican courts dismissing their cases
for lack of jurisdiction. 1 2 The defendants had no opportunity to participate in the Mexi-
can proceedings, nor were they made aware of them.' 13 The Ninth Circuit relied on In re
Bridgestone/Firestone14 to hold that "intervening developments in a foreign jurisdiction"
should warrant reconsideration by the district court with the benefit of "updated
information."] 15
The court in In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic On June 1, 2009 (Air Crash) was more
skeptical of plaintiffs' claims of forum unavailability.' 16 After the Air Crash court initially
declined jurisdiction over plaintiffs' case in favor of French courts, plaintiffs re-filed with-
out naming the parties necessary to secure French jurisdiction and argued that French
courts were thus "unavailable." '" 7 Unimpressed, the court dismissed again, finding no
"reason for why Plaintiffs removed the French Defendants, other than a desire to defeat
the Court's original forum non conveniens Order."" 8 Citing Gutierrez, the court held
that "a plaintiff whose case is dismissed for forum non conveniens must litigate in the
foreign forum in good faith." 119
108. Id. at *3-6.
109. K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach & CIA, SA., 648 F.3d 588, 597 (8th Cir. 2011).
110. In re Air Crash Over the Mid-Atiantic on June 1, 2009, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
111. Guiterrez v. Advanced Medical Optics, 640 F.3d 1025, 1032 (9th Cit. 2011).
112. Id. at 1028.
113. Brief for Appellee at 10, Gutierrez v. Advanced Medical Optics, 640 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2011).
114. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 420 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cit. 2005).
115. Gutierrez, 640 F.3d at 1031. A dissent by Judge Rawlinson criticized the majority for acting on Mexi-
can documents of questionable authenticity and warned that the court's decision would "encourage litigants
to manipulate the legal system to procure a more favorable forum." Id. at 1033-34.
116. Air Crash Over the Mid-Atlantic on June 1, 2009, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
117. Id. at 1093.
118. Id. at 1097.
119. Id. at 1095.
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B. CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron highlights potential complexities in enforcing a condi-
tional FNC dismissal order.120 In 1993, Chevron agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of
the courts in Lago Agrio, Ecuador as a condition to dismissal of environmental claims
brought by Ecuadorian plaintiffs in federal court. 121 In 2009, Chevron commenced bilat-
eral arbitration against the Republic of Ecuador to seek, among other things, a finding
that Chevron was not liable for the judgment in the Lago Agrio litigation. 122 Both the
Ecuadorian plaintiffs and the Republic of Ecuador filed an action in federal court to stay
the arbitration based on Chevron's prior commitment to submit the dispute to the courts
of Ecuador. 123 The district court refused to stay the arbitration, concluding that: (1)
Chevron explicitly reserved its right to challenge the validity of the Ecuadorian litigation
in other proceedings, and (2) the claims and parties in the Lago Agrio litigation and the
bilateral arbitration were insufficiently similar for estoppel to apply.' 24
C. FORUM DEFERENCE
In Carijano v. Occidental, the Ninth Circuit held that the traditional "considerable defer-
ence" given to a domestic plaintiffs choice of forum is preserved even when that plaintiff
sues alongside numerous foreign plaintiffs whose choices typically deserve "less defer-
ence." 125 In Tazoe v. Airbus, however, the court dismissed an American citizen's claims in
connection with a fatal airline crash in Brazil along with the numerous Brazilian citizens'
claims, without focusing on the different standards of deference. 126
IX. Parallel Proceedings
A. Colorado River Abstention and International Comity
In Microban Prods. Co. v. Microban Can. Inc.,127 the court rejected defendants' argument
that the abstention analysis laid out in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States128 (Colorado River) only applies when a party seeks a dismissal of a federal court
action based on a state court action. The court noted that in an international context it
could follow either "a modified Colorado River approach" or "a second similar approach
that emphasizes international comity," but in any event focused on the basic notions that
while "it may be appropriate for a federal court to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction
to avoid duplicative litigation," nonetheless "abstention is the exception rather than the
rule."' 29 On the facts, the court upheld the magistrate's decision not to abstain. 30 In
120. See Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron, 638 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2011).
121. Id. at 388.
122. Id. at 390.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 396-97.
125. Carijano v. Occidental, 643 F.3d 1216, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011).
126. Tazoe v. Airbus, 631 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir. 2011).
127. Microban Prods. Co. v. Microban Can. Inc., No. 3:10-CV-50, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7663
(W.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2011).
128. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1976).
129. Microban Prods., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7663, at *10-15.
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Holley Performance Prods. v. Tucows, Inc., the court likewise denied a motion for absten-
tion.131 Applying the "multi-factor balancing test set forth in Colorado River and its prog-
eny,"132 the court found that the only factor weighing in favor of abstention was the need
to avoid piecemeal litigation, which although the "most important factor," was nonethe-
less overcome by the balance of other factors against abstention. 33 In Putz v. Golden, the
court also refused to grant a motion to abstain in favor of alleged proceedings in French
Polynesia, after considering both Colorado River and international comity analyses.' 34 In
CAE USA, Inc. v. XL Ins. Co. Ltd., the court declined to dismiss pending domestic litiga-
tion in favor of parallel proceedings in Canada after analyzing three sets of factors drawn
from Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film,135 including factors on (a) international
comity,136 (b) "fairness to the litigants," 137 and (c) "efficient use of scarce judicial re-
sources." 138 The court in In re Braga followed the same approach but concluded that the
abstention requested in that case-a partial stay of a Brazilian bankruptcy trustee's discov-
ery requests under 28 U.S.C. § 1782-was warranted. 139
B. AN-n-Surr INJUNCTIONS
Some litigants seek to address the problems of parallel proceedings with preemptory
relief in the form of anti-suit injunctions. In Zynga, Inc. v. Vostu USA, Inc., the court noted
that the proper focus in such a request was on "factors specific to an anti-suit injunc-
tion" 140 and that the applicant need not show a likelihood of success on the merits of the
underlying claim. Nonetheless, the court determined that an anti-suit injunction was not
130. Id. at *15.
131. Holley Performance Prods. v. Tucows, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-180, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39846, at *1
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 12, 2011).
132. Id. at *8-9 (considering "(1) whether the [foreign] court has assumed jurisdiction over any res or prop-
erty; (2) whether the federal forum is less convenient to the parties; (3) avoidance of piecemeal litigation; ...
(4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained; .. .(5) whether the source of governing law is [foreign] or
federal; (6) the adequacy of the [foreign] court action to protect the federal plaintiffs rights; (7) the relative
progress of the [foreign] and federal proceedings; and (8) the presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction").
133. Id. at *16.
134. Putz v. Golden, No. CIO-0741JLR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129411, *17-18 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 7,
2010).
135. Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film, 25 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1994).
136. CAE USA, Inc. v. XL Ins. Co. Ltd., No. 8:1 1-cv-64--T-24 TBM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52794, at
*10 (M.D. Fla. May 17, 2011) ("(1) whether the judgment was rendered via fraud; (2) whether the judgment
was rendered by a competent court utilizing proceedings consistent with civilized jurisprudence; and (3)
whether the foreign judgment is prejudicial, in the sense of violating American public policy because it is
repugnant to fundamental principles of what is decent and just").
137. Id. at *13 ("(1) the order in which the suits were filed; (2) the more convenient forum; and (3) the
possibility of prejudice to parties resulting from abstention").
138. Id. at *14 ("(1) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (2) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litiga-
tion; (3) whether the actions have parties and issues in common; and (4) whether the alternative forum is
likely to render a prompt disposition").
139. In re Braga, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
140. Zynga, Inc. v. Vostu USA, Inc., No. l-CV-02959-EJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106192, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) (specifically "(1) whether or not the parties and the issues are the same, and whether or
not the first action is dispositive of the action to be enjoined; (2) whether the foreign litigation would frustrate
a policy of the forum issuing the injunction; and (3) whether the impact on comity would be tolerable").
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warranted on the facts.' 41 The court in Blom v. Pictometry Int'l Corp. also declined to enter
an anti-suit injunction barring a party from litigating a claim in Norway, noting that it
would be "tantamount to enjoining the tribunal of a foreign sovereign" and that such an
"extraordinary power should be used sparingly."142 In Stolt Tankers BVv. Allianz Seguros,
SA.,143 however, the court applied the five factors articulated by the Second Circuit in
China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M. V. Cboong Yong,144 and determined that an anti-suit injunc-
tion was warranted to prevent a party from pursuing litigation in Brazil while arbitration
was pending in New York.145
141. 1d. at *16.
142. Blom v. Pictometry Int'l Corp., No. 10-CV-6607L, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78110, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
July 19, 2011).
143. Stolt Tankers BV v. Allianz Seguros, S.A., No. 11 Civ. 2331 (SAS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67755
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
144. China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1987).
145. Stolt Tankers BV, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67755, at *17-18. The court focused on the possibility of
disparate results from the failure of the Brazilian court to apply the principles of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act and the frustration of the federal policy in favor of arbitration.
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